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Abstract
Most welfare programs generate high marginal tax rates on labor income.
This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France’s main
welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, or RMI) to estimate
monetary gains to employment for welfare recipients. This is based on the
distribution of potential monthly earnings faced by each individual, as in-
ferred from the distribution of observed wages and working time. Taking
account of the welfare earnings top-up program (inte´ressement), we find
that gains are almost always positive, but that their amount is very low,
especially for single mothers. Inte´ressement is found to have a small impact,
because of its provisional nature. Gains are positively related to the prob-
ability that a welfare recipient in 1996 will be observed in employment in
1998. Using a simple structural model, we interpret this as a labor supply
effect.
Re´sume´
Beaucoup de transferts sociaux produisent des taux marginaux d’imposition
e´leve´s sur les revenus du travail. Cet article utilise un e´chantillon de be´ne´ficiaires
du principal dispositif d’aide sociale (le Revenu minimum d’insertion, RMI)
pour estimer les gains mone´taires a` l’emploi. On s’appuie sur la distribution
des revenus mensuels potentiels a` laquelle chaque individu fait face et qui
est elle-meˆme de´duite de la distribution des salaires horaires et des temps
de travail observe´s. En tenant compte des incitations produites par le dis-
positif d’inte´ressement, nous trouvons que les gains a` l’emploi sont presque
toujours positifs mais que les montants sont tre`s faibles, notamment pour
les me`res isole´es. L’inte´ressement pe`se peu en raison de son caracte`re pro-
visoire. Les gains potentiels sont positivement corre´le´s avec la probabilite´
qu’un be´ne´ficiaire observe´ en 1996 occupe un emploi en 1998. A partir d’un
simple mode`le structurel, nous interpre´tons cette relation comme un effet
d’offre de travail.
Keywords: Welfare, labor earnings, transfers, tax-system
Mots-cle´: minima sociaux, revenus du travail, transferts, syste`me fiscal
JEL Codes / Codes JEL: I38, J31, C34
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1 Introduction
The debate surrounding the policy of a guaranteed minimum income has
been lively in both the popular press and the scientific literature. Economists
have tended to focus on the possible disincentive effects that such a policy
might provide with respect to labor force participation because of the high
effective marginal tax rate that it imposes at the bottom of the income
distribution. This has come as a justification for implementing schemes
that locally reduce marginal tax rates, such as negative income taxes. The
vast majority of empirical studies have focused on the North American (and
the United States in particular) labor markets (Moffitt, 2002), while it seems
clear (in a prima facie sense) that an analysis of the policy of a guaranteed
minimum income is likely to be more relevant for European countries, as the
level and ubiquity of these policies is much more important on the eastern
shore of the Atlantic.
This paper addresses this question by measuring the size of the monetary
work incentive faced by recipients of the guaranteed minimum income pro-
gram in France, i.e. the gap between the labor market income they can earn
and the level of welfare. We take full account of the fact that individuals may
face hours constraints on their working time (Dickens and Lundberg, 1993,
Euwals and van Soest, 1999). As individuals face take-it-or-leave-it job of-
fers comprised of a wage-hours pair, this gives rise to a discrete labor supply
model. In this context, the graph of implicit marginal tax rates is not suffi-
cient information to figure out the incentive effects of a policy, because not
all points are available, and thus relevant, for individual decision-making.
We also depart from the accounting-representative household approach
that is widely used to evaluate transfer programs along the lines of the
OECD (2003) report “Making Work Pay”. In these analyses, labor earnings
are arbitrarily attributed to representative households for comparison with
their transfer income. This has the clear disadvantage of ignoring the dif-
ferences across individuals in their characteristics and actual labor market
perspectives.1
In this paper, we ask how much money each welfare beneficiary from a
representative survey would gain if she were to be employed on the job that
is typically accessible to her at some point in time, given her characteristics
and the demand for labor. To this end, we estimate equations for the dis-
tribution of wages and working time offered by potential employers, given
1Concerning the RMI in France, see, for example, Padieu (1997), Join-Lambert (1998)
and Gautie´ and Gubian (2000).
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worker productive characteristics. Distributions are parametric but flexible
and fit the data very well. Estimates are based on observed earnings, with
selectivity correction using non-wage income and demographics as instru-
ments. Our counterfactual is thus to make every welfare recipient receive
and accept a draw from these potential offers. We then measure their dis-
posable income increase (or decrease) using all relevant features of the tax
and transfer system. Put differently, we estimate the returns to work based
on earnings typical of what each welfare leaver might get if working. When
these returns are low, labor supply policies to increase employment may be
warranted, especially if targeted on relevant sub-populations. We then es-
timate a structural model that relates these gains to observed employment
status.
The estimation and simulation is based on a representative data set
of RMI beneficiaries in December 1996 (Devenir des personnes sorties du
RMI) resurveyed in January 1998. Although there are other social programs
that generate incentive problems, for reasons of clarity and data availability,
we focus primarily on the main nationwide guaranteed minimum income
program with almost unrestricted access, called the RMI (Revenu Minimum
d’Insertion), that benefits approximately 3% of the population and is of
central importance in the French welfare system.
Improving incentives while maintaining protection against poverty is a
major issue of most welfare programs. The RMI program comprises a tem-
porary scheme (“inte´ressement”) that maintains part of the welfare transfer
on top of wages for a limited amount of time (for the first 750 hours of work
as of survey time, the rules having changed since then). It has the incen-
tive effect of temporarily reducing the marginal tax rate from 100% to 50%.
When taking account of this scheme, we compute the present value of the
job in this setting and compare it with the present value of receiving RMI
forever.
Laroque and Salanie´ (2000) examine the impact of incentives on labor
supply considering the whole fiscal system and total French population.
Using a static structural model, they estimate that inactive women living
in a couple require, on average, and extra 579 euros per month in order
to participate, that single women would be willing to accept a reduction in
labor income of 305-610 euros per month before withdrawing from the labor
force (although single mothers would need to see their earnings increase to
enter the labor force), and that the majority of men, single or in a couple,
would be willing to work even at lower earnings levels than they currently
receive. In this work, however, they exclude part-time jobs from their data
and have incomplete information on household income. Laroque and Salanie´
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(2002) introduce female part-time work. In this work, we concentrate on
the population on welfare, that is most subject to high marginal tax rates,
using a representative sample. As we will show here, part-time work is
also relevant for men in this context, largely due to a particular public
employment program called the Employment Solidarity Contract (Contrat
emploi solidarite´) whose effects are explicitly modeled. More importantly,
the temporary incentive scheme (inte´ressement) is usually not taken into
consideration when the welfare system is evaluated, in part because of lack
of data. We reconstitute information on this scheme, so as to evaluate
income changes more accurately.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2, a
brief account of the French welfare system is presented with an emphasis on
the RMI. In section 3 we lay out a model and the econometric techniques
employed for estimating potential labor market earnings conditional on ob-
servable characteristics. Section 4 describes the data used for the estimation
and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 describes the distribution of
the size of the monetary incentives implied by the estimates in section 4.
Section 6 considers the link between the gains to employment and the ob-
served probability of employment, while section 7 concludes.
2 Welfare Income in France
This paper focuses on France’s guaranteed minimum income (RMI), a wel-
fare program accessible to any person aged 25 and over,2 provided that the
sum of all resources available to his or her household is below a threshold
that depends on family composition. More than 1 million households receive
payments from the RMI system, covering approximately 3% of the popu-
lation. These take the form of a monetary transfer that brings household
resources up to the threshold. Other guaranteed income programs (with
restricted access) do exist, such as those for the elderly, handicapped, wid-
ows and widowers and single parents with children below 3.3 These other
programs are typically more generous than RMI, and the transfers for the
handicapped and the elderly cover a large number of people, while the pop-
ulation covered by the widow/widower benefits is rather limited. However,
the role of these transfers in affecting the labor market behavior of those
concerned is likely to be quite different from that of the RMI. Finally, the
unemployed who have exhausted their unemployment benefits have access
2This age restriction does not apply for people with underage dependents.
3This last benefit cannot be received for more than 3 years total.
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to a specific benefit whose amount is similar to that of RMI.4
When comparing labor income with welfare income, additional transfers
related to family composition and housing must be considered. Most family
composition-based benefits are means tested, increase with the number of
children, and vary with the presence or absence of children under 3 years
old.5 Among the housing-based benefits, households who rent their lodging
(or own it and are paying interest) are eligible for subsidies that apply dif-
ferently to the private and public sector housing.6 They depend on taxable
income at a decreasing marginal rate, which varies with family composition
and on the amount of the rent, and are subject to different thresholds based
on the zone of habitation.7 In the typical situation, when taxable income is
zero and the rent is below the threshold, the subsidy covers up to 90% of
the rent. All of these transfers are included in the household resources when
calculating eligibility for the RMI.8
Call sRMI the guaranteed threshold and T (w) the net transfers available
to a household with labor income w. In the absence of any further incentive,
the household benefits from the RMI scheme when w + T (w) < sRMI , in
which case its guaranteed disposable income is sRMI . Otherwise, its pre-tax
income is w + T (w). As such, the RMI generates a 100% implicit marginal
tax rate on earnings such that household income is below the RMI threshold.
Inte´ressement reduces this rate to 50% and extends the range of affected
earnings. If a recipient takes a job, only half of his labor income is considered
when eligibility for further RMI transfers is determined: the criteria becomes
w/2+T (w) < sRMI . Disposable income is then w/2+sRMI . But this is only
4Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to observe individuals who receive the single
parents with young children benefit or the transfer in the event of unemployment benefit
exhaustion.
5Every household responsible for at least 2 children is entitled to a transfer (Alloca-
tions familiales). The additional, means-tested, transfers considered in this paper are the
Complement familial, Allocation pour jeune enfant and Allocation de rentre´e scolaire. A
subsidy for children in school which was introduced in 1995 (Aide a` la scolarite´) is not
considered here. We also exclude the Allocation parentale d’e´ducation, which is available
to every household with at least 2 children, of which one is less than 3 years old, provided
one of the spouses does not work or works part time and can justify at least 2 years of
work over the last 5 or 10 years (depending on the number of children).
6Allocation logement and Aide personalise´e au logement.
7The taxable income considered is that of the previous year, something that we do
not explicitly take into account in the simulations. As we use the current income, or
expected income, for the calculation of tax rates, this is equivalent to imposing a form of
stationarity in the income process.
8The housing subsidy receives a special tax treatment that is accounted for in our
modelling of the system of taxes and transfers but whose complexities go beyond this
general presentation.
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temporary and lasts for the first 750 hours worked.9 When this entitlement
to inte´ressement is exhausted, the household faces the 100% implicit tax rate
on earnings below the RMI threshold and the general income tax system for
earnings above this level. This scheme is complicated by several rules that
allow the hours counter to be reset to zero when additional transitions to and
from employment take place. We do not consider these complications here,
and compare income when continuously on RMI with income from a stable
job. In one variation, we consider the case where the job terminates with
a fixed probability every month, in which case the person falls back into
RMI.10 Although a dynamic approach would be legitimate, one can still
draw major insights from the (more frequently used) static labor supply
approach.
This complex system gives rise to a characteristic profile for the RMI ben-
eficiaries effective marginal tax rate on labor income. Setting inte´ressement
aside for the moment, the marginal tax rate is 100% below the income
threshold w that verifies w + T (w) = sRMI . Figure 1 depicts earned labor
income versus disposable income of a single person that does not receive
the housing subsidy.11 On the bottom line, the guaranteed income is 325
euros12 (less than half of earnings from a month long full-time job at the
minimum wage). For earnings beyond this amount, labor income is taxed at
a marginal rate of 0% then 8% after 450 euros and 17% starting at earnings
of approximately 900 euros.
Because RMI recipients are not subject to an income tax, but become so
as soon as they leave the program, their marginal tax rate is locally infinity
(at 325 euros in the single person example). This decrease in disposable
income is even more pronounced for those eligible for a housing subsidy,
because labor income is taken into account in the means-tested housing
subsidy as soon as the person has left RMI (this feature has been corrected
in recent legislation).
The budget set under inte´ressement is also presented on figure 1. The
marginal rate is reduced to 50% and RMI eligibility is extended up to earn-
ings of 650 euros because only half of the wage income is considered under
9The 750 hour limit was relevant in 1998, the period covered by our data. Since then,
the time limit has been extended.
10This approach is equivalent to assuming either that there is no possibility of unem-
ployment insurance or that the individual does not acquire enough work experience to be
eligible for unemployment insurance when the job is lost.
11In this figure and the following one, the rules that were in effect in July 1998 are
applied.
12All earnings amounts in this section refer to monthly earnings.
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this scheme. After 750 hours, the budget set drops down to the bottom line.
Naturally, under this scheme, the effect of taxation and housing benefit loss
after 650 euros is more pronounced under inte´ressement, as illustrated in the
figure. Under inte´ressement there is much more incentive to take a 650 euros
than, say, a 660 euros job. Such a shift of incentives towards lower wages
(or, equivalently, part-time work) is a shared feature of negative income tax
schedules (Moffit, 2003; Saez 2002).
At the other end of the spectrum, consider a couple with 3 children,
one below 3, which receives a housing subsidy (figure 2). Resources are
over 1,100 euros under the RMI. After the first 750 hours, inte´ressement
is no longer available (bottom line), in which case the household becomes
ineligible for the RMI once labor earnings exceed 538 euros since the house-
hold then attains the RMI threshold after adding in family benefits. The
marginal effective tax rate drops below 100% for household earnings beyond
538 euros, but remains at about 20% on average until labor income reaches
2150 euros. This is because of the importance of means tested family-related
transfers for this type of household. The tax rate then drops to less than 8%
once it depends solely on the income tax, which is very favorable to large
families, and starts increasing again only at very high wages. Because of
these high marginal rates at low incomes, the budget sets with and without
inte´ressement are less contrasted than in the single person example.
Based on these few cases, it is clear that the French welfare system im-
poses very high effective marginal tax rates on labor income, up to 100%
(and locally infinity), over a large range of labor earnings, due to the accu-
mulation of means-tested schemes.13 This point has often been noted in the
literature (e.g. Laroque and Salanie´ (1999), among others). In this context,
the presence of inte´ressement, though largely neglected in the literature, has
the potential to have a large impact on incentives and behavior. Although
the entire profile of the marginal tax rate is of interest, certain ranges of fig-
ures 1 and 2 may be more relevant than others for a given household when
the jobs proposed by potential employers tend to be disproportionately sit-
uated in particular intervals on the labor earnings axis. The strategy of this
paper is to identify the points that are relevant to the actual beneficiaries of
RMI, and compare those potential incomes with their resources on welfare.
13L’Horty and Anne (2002), using a number of case studies, have illustrated the fact
that additional programs independently implemented by local governments, when they
exist, tend to increase further the marginal tax rates. Due to the lack of exhaustive data
on these local-level programs, they are not considered in this paper.
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3 The Model Framework
In order to estimate the size of the differential between labor market earn-
ings and the RMI, and the resulting impacts on labor supply, we need to
be able to impute relevant wages and working hours for those individuals
who receive the RMI. This implies the estimation of a model for the joint
distribution of potential wage and hours combinations that are offered to
individuals with a given set of observable characteristics, based on data on
the observed earnings of a selected population. We make individuals draw
in this distribution (unconditional on observed employment status) to form
the distribution of their potential labor incomes and compare it with wel-
fare. We then relate the resulting labor incentives to observed employment
status, based on a simple static behavioral equation.
The huge discontinuities illustrated in figures 1 and 2 would generate
ill-behaved likelihood functions if earnings and labor supply equations were
to be estimated jointly. Indeed, a marginal change in the wage distribu-
tion parameters, for instance, can create a discontinuity in the employment
probability. Laroque and Salanie´ (2000) suggest smoothing the disposable
income function, but this is not realistic in our context given the large steps
produced by inte´ressement. As a result, we proceed sequentially by first esti-
mating the wage and hours distribution and then conditioning the structural
labor supply model on these implied gains to employment.
3.1 The Basic Model
Suppose that employers propose jobs characterized by an hourly wage rate(
wd
)
and a number of monthly hours worked
(
hd
)
. Given the diversity
of employers and jobs available in the labor market, a large number of(
wd, hd
)
pairs can be proposed in the economy to each individual. The
distribution of proposed wage-hours pairs forms the labor demand set faced
by the individual and is conditional upon his or her productive human cap-
ital characteristics (X). We assume that demographic characteristics and
family status do affect labor supply but do not affect productive capacities,
and are thus not included in the vector X that determines labor demand.
These additional variables, and possibly some elements of X, are grouped
into a vector Z that affects preferences.
Utility is defined with respect to income and hours worked as
U (D (wh, y0, Z) , h;Z, ε)
where ε captures unobserved characteristics that affect preferences on top of
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Z. The function D (·) computes disposable income, based on labor earnings
(wh), wealth (y0) and family characteristics relevant to compute taxes and
transfers (at most a subset of Z). When not working, utility is therefore
U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε) and depends only on y0, Z and ε.
We assume that individuals receive job offers from the joint distribution
of
(
wd, hd|X
)
. A person will accept any such offer which provides at least
the utility of not working, that is when:
U
(
D
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)
, hd;Z, ε
)
≥ U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε) (1)
Even if ε is independent from
(
wd, hd|X
)
, the distribution of observed wages
and hours is not representative of the distribution of
(
wd, hd|X
)
because
condition 1 restricts the set of observed values. For instance, if U ′D > 0,
observed wages may be on average higher than proposed wages. For this
reason, selectivity must be accounted for when estimating the distribution
of
(
wd, hd|X
)
. The existence of variables in Z and y0 that do not affect
proposed wages and hours is sufficient to identify conditional means. How-
ever, parametric distributional assumptions are needed to recover the full
distribution.
With an estimate of the distribution of
(
wd, hd|X
)
we can proceed in two
directions. First, we may describe the size of the monetary work incentive
provided by the legislation to any individual, as measured by the distribution
of
D
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)
|X −D (0, y0, Z)
where the first term is derived from the distribution of proposed wages and
hours. This answers the question: Does work pay?
Such a comparison is also valid in a present value context, provided that
utility when working and utility when not working are discounted using a
common discount factor, ρ. However it ignores the time-limited nature of the
inte´ressement scheme that temporarily reduces implicit marginal tax rates.
Call tI the number of periods of inte´ressement available to a given person,
DI (wh, y0, Z) the disposable income for those periods and D0 (wh, y0, Z)
disposable income thereafter. When tI > 0, we may compare the present
value of disposable income computed as
D (wh, y0, Z) =
tI−1∑
t=0
ρtDI (wh, y0, Z) +
∞∑
t=tI
ρtD0 (wh, y0, Z)
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with
D (0, y0, Z) =
∞∑
t=0
ρtD0 (0, y0, Z) .
If pi is the probability that the job is lost every period, this can be further
modified:
D (wh, y0, Z) =
tI−1∑
t=0
((1− pi) ρ)tDI (wh, y0, Z)
+
∞∑
t=tI
((1− pi) ρ)tD0 (wh, y0, Z)
+
∞∑
t=1
((1 + (1− pi) (1− ρ)) ρ)t ρpiD0 (0, y0, Z)
Our secondary focus is on the relation between disposable income and
labor supply. Indeed, equation 1 can be treated as a structural labor supply
equation that depends on individual preferences and observed or potential
earnings. Given the discrete nature of this model, however, comparing em-
ployed individuals with different earnings would provide no information on
preferences (all of them have preferred observed earnings to no earnings). In
contrast to usual continuous labor supply models,14 identification of prefer-
ences in such a model thus relies on the comparison between employed and
non-employed agents.
3.2 Econometric Specification and Estimation
We begin our discussion of the econometric specification with the estimation
of the wage-hours distribution. The French guaranteed income transfer is
such that a full-time job paid the hourly minimum wage raises income sig-
nificantly, relative to being on welfare. Part-time work is therefore a central
issue, as it is the potential source of incentive problems. For this reason,
particular attention is paid to the estimation of the full distribution of pro-
posed hours, hd. Furthermore, the existence of a minimum wage generates
14In many continuous labor supply models, hours are supposed to be a choice variable
for the individual. Hours variation conditional on wages can thus be used to gather
information on preferences. In our setting hours are not chosen by the individual per
se, but rather each person is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it job offer. In this context, as
the wage-hours pair is set by the employer, hours variation conditional on wages is not
sufficient to infer preferences.
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a mass point in the distribution of hourly wages that must be taken into ac-
count. These considerations imply that flexible distributional assumptions,
or semi- or non-parametric estimators, are warranted.
On another hand, inferring the full unconditional distribution from the
observed distribution that is conditional on selection into employment is
impossible unless the distribution is parameterized.15 As we are interested
in characterizing the entire distribution of gains to employment, we use
mixtures of normal and logistic distributions so as to mimic observed distri-
butions within a strictly parametric framework.16 In addition, we must take
explicit account of a widespread public employment program, the Employ-
ment Solidarity Contract (Contrat emploi solidarite´, or CES), that provides
half-time jobs at the minimum wage with specific rules concerning top-up
(inte´ressement) income.17 Given these considerations, we estimate the fol-
lowing statistical model.
A CES is proposed when
XβC + uC ≥ 0 (2)
If a CES offer is not received, a “regular job” wage is drawn. It is paid
the minimum wage, w = w, if
XβS + uS ≥ 0 (3)
Otherwise, the wage is drawn in a truncated wage distribution with density
fw(w|w > w) = fw(w)/P (w > w)
and the underlying density of w is generalized logistic:
fw(w) =
exp((m− w)/s)
s (1 + exp((m− w)/s))2
where parameters m and s are estimated.
Hours worked can be drawn from a full-time distribution or a part time
distribution. If
XβH + uH ≥ 0 (4)
15This does not imply that moments of these distributions can not be estimated; see
Das, Newey and Vella (2003).
16For example, we found that the distribution of log hourly wages conditional on being
paid above the minimum more closely resembles a truncated generalized logistic distri-
bution than a truncated normal distribution, while we use a probit specification - and
thereby a normal distribution - to model the probability of being paid the minimum wage.
17This type of contract is not specifically considered in figures 1 and 2.
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then hours is drawn from a full-time truncated distribution with density
f1h
(
h|h > 0, h ≤ h
)
= f1h(h)/P
(
h > 0, h ≤ h
)
where h is the maximum working time.18 Otherwise, the hours worked are
drawn from the part time density f2h
(
h|h > 0, h ≤ h
)
, defined in a similar
manner. The underlying densities are also generalized logistic:
fih(h) =
exp ((mi − h) /si)
si (1 + exp ((mi − h) /si))2
, i = 1, 2
We setm1 = 169, the standard full-time monthly hours worked andm2 = 87,
the standard half-time hours worked. Parameters s1 and s2 are estimated.
Finally, in order to account for the selectivity into employment, we as-
sume that a reduced form to equation 1 can be approximated by
(X,Z,D0 (0, y0, Z))γ + η ≥ 0 (5)
Although this linear approximation is questionable with respect to the struc-
tural interpretation of the equation, it must be clear that, at this stage, this
equation is only meant to control for selectivity, using variables in Z ex-
cluded from X.
All residuals (uC , uS , uH , η) are assumed to be jointly normally distrib-
uted. However, it was necessary to impose the constraints ρuC ,uS = 0 and
ρuC ,uH = 0 in order to obtain convergence. The model is estimated by sim-
ulated maximum likelihood using the GHK simulator (see Hajivassiliou and
Ruud, 1994). It should be noted that, because of the strong presence of CES
and the important modes in the empirical hours and wage distributions at
half-time work, full-time work and the hourly minimum wage, our estimation
strategy focuses around these categories as well as CES while also correcting
for selection bias. Unfortunately, given the limited data at hand, the under-
lying full-time hours, part-time hours and wage distributions (represented
by generalized truncated logistic distributions) could not be conditioned on
X and on selection. Figures 3a-3b illustrate the performance of this statis-
tical model. The observed distributions of wages and hours are compared
with their distributions simulated from this model (conditional on employ-
ment) on the employed population. In spite of its very parametric nature,
the presence of mixtures and proper accounting for truncation appear to
18As we have no a priori knowledge of the maximum monthly working time of the set
of offered jobs, we used the sample maximum for each sex to define h, which is the best
nonparametric estimator of this parameter. For men, h = 312, while for women, h = 333 2
3
.
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generate a remarkably good fit. Moreover, the observed share of employed
at the minimum wage is 69.78% and the estimated share is 69.45%.
In order to further investigate the link between gains to employment
and observed employment, we then estimate the structural model based on
equation 1. In order to take simple functional forms for utility functions, we
set:
U (D (wh, y0, Z) , h;Z, ε) = α logD (wh, y0, Z) + k(h) + Zδ + ε
when working, and:
U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε) = α logD (0, y0, Z) + k(0) + Zδ0 + ε0
if not working. We normalize k(0) = δ0 = ε0 = 0 and var(ε) = 1. k(h)
is a function to be specified. If we assume, as in van Soest (1995), that
ε is independent of (wd, hd|X), then the contribution to the likelihood for
working individuals is:
P (Employment at w, h|X,Z, y0) = P (ε ≥ α [logD (0, y0, Z)
− logD (wh, y0, Z)]
−k(h)− Zδ)
×f(w, h|X)
(6)
and for non-working individuals:
P (Non-Employment |X,Z, y0) =
∫
wd
∫
hd P (ε < α [logD (0, y0, Z)
− logD
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)]
−k(hd)− Zδ
)
×f(wd, hd|X)dwddhd
(7)
where the joint distribution f(wd, hd|X) has been previously estimated as
described above. Because of the independence assumption, the density in
equation 6 can be neglected when maximizing the likelihood function. Thus
conditioning on realized (w, h) is possible and this would identify the model
even if the D functions were independent of y0 and Z. This identification
relies on the fact that, if α > 0, observed wages must be higher than average
offered wages (where offered wages are simply identified by the exclusion of
some variables in Z and y0 from the variables in X in the first-step estima-
tion). Additional identification is provided by further variation in D due to
factors that have no direct effect on preferences for work (such as housing
allowances that depend on public or private housing sector, ownership and
zones).
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4 Data and Earnings Estimation Results
In this section, we begin by describing the data we use for our analyses
and provide some basic descriptive analysis concerning the jobs that RMI
recipients obtain when they leave the RMI. We then present the results of
estimating the proposed wage and hours distributions.
4.1 The Data
We use the Outcomes for RMI Recipients Survey (Devenir des personnes
sorties du RMI, see Fouge`re and Rioux, 2002), which was undertaken by
the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)
in collaboration with several other public institutions. A representative sam-
ple of RMI recipients was drawn and surveyed in December of 1996 and a
follow-up survey was then administered one year later, in January 1998. We
exploit this second cross-section which includes, along with demographic
and household characteristics, information concerning the employment sta-
tus of the person, in particular his or her monthly earnings and hours (if
employed) as well as all of the information necessary to reconstruct the other
transfers for which the household is eligible. This last point is particularly
important, since the housing subsidies introduce a highly nonlinear, and
sometimes discontinuous, relation between labor earnings and disposable
income (see section 2); it is thus critical to be able to identify precisely the
households that have access to this subsidy and to adjust their disposable
income accordingly.
Residual eligibility for inte´ressement payments at the follow-up survey
date is not directly measured. Nevertheless, it depends on the time spent
working in the past months or years, according to a complex set of rules. We
use activity calendars to calculate the number of hours during which each
individual may still be eligible for inte´ressement payments as of January
1998. We were able to reconstruct this information for 87% of the sample.
By construction, the remaining 13% are individuals with neither long periods
of employment nor long periods of non-employment over the past year.19
When eligibility is available, we find that 72% of the population has the
opportunity to benefit the RMI top-up for the full 750 hours, whereas 19%
has exhausted this possibility and would get the disposable incomes drawn
19The subsamples for which residual inte´ressement rights can and cannot be calculated
seem roughly similar on the basis of observable characteristics, and as a result we perform
the majority of our analyses only on the sample for which we are able to reconstruct
residual rights to inte´ressement payments.
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on the bottom lines of figures 1 and 2. The remaining 9% is eligible, but for
less than 750 hours, with residual hours distributed rather smoothly. These
figures are decomposed by gender in the Appendix table.
We use the survey both to estimate the structure of wages and hours
available to RMI recipients and to simulate the potential gains to employ-
ment for the entire population of RMI recipients. We restrict our attention
to people between 17 and 55 years old, and we exclude students and retirees
and some missing observations, which leaves us with 2,764 beneficiaries.
Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix. We also eliminate self-
employment for the estimation of potential income. We assume 100 percent
take-up of transfers for which the household is eligible in the simulations.20
This provides us with a lower bound on the gains from employment. In
order to avoid the complicated issue of simultaneous labor supply decision
making within households, couples are excluded from the sample when we
examine the link between gains to employment and observed employment.21
The data is also subject to measurement error with respect to reported
earnings and hours. Monthly earnings as well as usual weekly hours are
recorded by the survey. It appears that a significant portion (roughly one
third) of the hourly wage rates computed from this information lie below the
minimum wage. Most of these inconsistencies are obviously due to round-
ing errors and the fact that relatively few individuals in the sample are
paid above from the minimum wage in this population. Thus, whenever re-
ported hourly wages fall below the minimum wage, we assume that monthly
earnings are more reliable than monthly hours, set the hourly wage to the
minimum wage and recompute hours based on reported monthly earnings
so as to be compatible with existing minimum wage laws.
4.2 Realized Outcomes of the RMI Recipient Population
Before considering potential gains to employment for the RMI recipient pop-
ulation, it is useful to analyze the realized outcomes for those actually em-
ployed at a point in time. Of the initial December 1996 sample, one-third are
employed a year later, only 10% of whom are in self-employment. Among
those in employment, 33% are employed under the CES public employment
program. These jobs are half-time jobs paid at the minimum wage and they
20Our data do not contain sufficient information to measure take-up rates accurately.
See Gilles-Simon and Legros (1996) and Terracol (2003) for analyses of benefit take-up in
France.
21Individuals in couples do, however, contribute to the estimation of the wage and hours
offer distributions.
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represent an important aspect of the government’s active labor market poli-
cies. Zoyem (1999) shows that this sort of contract is frequently proposed to
RMI recipients, and is occasionally incorporated into an individual’s “rein-
sertion contract”.22
Figures 4a and 4b report observed monthly earnings (wage rate times
hours worked, gross of any transfers). They make clear that the earnings of
RMI recipients, once reemployed, are low and concentrated around the half-
time and full-time minimum wage. The strong bimodal distribution is very
unusual for the male population. It is also clear that active labor market
policy, in the form of CES jobs, plays an important role in this phenomenon.
This reinforces the justification for the specification described in section 3.2,
in particular equation 2. It also suggests that the gains to employment might
be cyclically sensitive as well as dependent on the attitude of policy makers
toward active labor market policy.
4.3 Estimation Results
The results of estimating the reduced form models described in section 3
are presented in table 1. The models were estimated separately for men and
women. All continuous variables used in the estimation are standardized to
be mean 0 and to have a unit standard deviation, implying that the coef-
ficients are interpretable as the effect of a single standard deviation change
in the corresponding variables.
As the correlation coefficients between the selection equation and the
various other models make clear, selection bias is an issue for men in the
CES equation23 and for women in the minimum wage and working time
models. Our specification includes education as a set of indicator variables
corresponding to the highest degree obtained (the reference is primary ed-
ucation), a quadratic specification in age, an indicator variable for French
nationality and another for living in the Paris region. Disposable income
on welfare, and demographics are included only into the selection equation.
Overall, the explanatory power of the observed variables in our model seems
limited, and this is likely related to the fact that we study a relatively ho-
mogenous population, at least in terms of their labor market prospects.
22Reinsertion contracts are programs negotiated between the RMI recipient and his or
her caseworker, intended to help the RMI recipient plan his or her transition from welfare
back into work (Zoyem, 1999).
23The tendency of the estimated parameter to head toward the upper bound suggests
that this correlation coefficient may be poorly identified. However, this appears to be
primarily a sampling issue (and not a case of the parameter being fundamentally uniden-
tifiable), since the same parameter for women behaves much more reasonably.
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Commenting on the selection equations, it is clear that the probability
of employment increases with education for both sexes, with the significant
coefficient on education category 4 reflecting the technical or professional
nature of this type of education. Having children, especially young children,
reduces the chance of a female welfare recipient in 1996 being employed in
1998, although the effect does not appear relevant (and is even reversed for
the oldest children) for men. Women in couples and widows are much less
likely to be employed than women who have never been married (conditional
on age), whereas men in couples are significantly more likely to be observed
in employment relative to never married men. The profile of employment
with respect to age is not significantly different from flat for women, whereas
the probability of employment decreases with age for men who received
RMI benefits in 1996, at least initially. The full profile is convex, but not
significantly so.
It is interesting to note that the reduced form coefficients on disposable
income from welfare (D (0, y0, Z)) are generally positive, and significantly
so for women. This implies that additional income provided by the RMI
may not reduce, and may actually be associated with an increase in the
probability of an individual being observed in employment. That said, the
model outlined in section 3.1 has no implication on the sign of this effect,
because D (0, y0, Z) is generally correlated with D (wh, y0, Z) and it is the
difference between the two that is relevant for job acceptance.
We turn next to the equations describing the probability of drawing a
CES. Table 1 suggests that such jobs are less common in the Paris region
than elsewhere in France, and that the probability that a woman draws a
CES is concave in her age. The correlation coefficients suggest, especially for
men, that the unobserved events that make a person likely to be employed
also increase the chances that the job will be a CES.
Considering the wage and working time models, it appears that the prob-
ability that a female welfare recipient will draw a minimum wage job de-
creases initially with age, then increases later as the profile is convex. Fur-
thermore, the most educated workers are significantly less likely to draw a
minimum wage job in the event that they do not otherwise get one through
a CES, for both men and women. Education does not, however, seem to
be significantly related to the probability of drawing a full-time job for men
or women. Full-time jobs are significantly over-represented among women
living in the Paris region, however. Given that much of the dispersion in
male working time is due simply to the nature of the job (CES or non-CES)
(figure 4b), one does not expect the men’s working time equation to perform
particularly well.
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The remaining correlation coefficients are only significant for women,
and these are only significant at the 10% level. Still, the signs are negative
for both men and women on the correlation between the minimum wage
and full time employment equations, suggesting that non-CES minimum
wage jobs are also more often part-time than full-time. There is also a
negative correlation for both men and women between the disturbances of
the employment and minimum wage equations, suggesting that those people
more likely to be seen in work are also less likely to draw a minimum wage
job when they are not offered a CES.
5 The Gains to Employment
We use the results presented in table 1 to assign disposable income for
each household in the full (representative) sample. To do this, we draw
wage rates and working hours from their estimated distributions, uncondi-
tional on employment status (this applies to everyone, whether employed or
not).24 Figures 5a and 5b illustrate the distributions of hours thus generated
(the dashed lines, labeled “Estimated”). Hours are extremely concentrated
around half-time work, especially for women, but also for men. Also, more
than 80% of simulated jobs are paid the minimum wage. In the context of
the model outlined in section 3.1, these can be interpreted as the offered
wage-hours combinations this population might receive, noted
(
wd, hd|X
)
above.
Given each household’s simulated labor earnings, we apply the system
of taxes and transfers present in France in 1998 and described in section 2,
to obtain a measure of disposable income while employed. We consider 3
alternative scenarios.
1. A baseline scenario: the inte´ressement top-up is computed for those
who are eligible until their eligibility runs out, then the individual
is subject to the regular earnings environment (including the RMI
minimum income guarantee) forever;
2. A comparison scenario for evaluating the importance of inte´ressement:
the job is held forever but everyone is assumed to have exhausted their
inte´ressement eligibility;25
24We draw 20 unconditional wage-hours pairs per observation (generating 55,280 points)
based on the full econometric model in order to obtain a smoother view of the overall
distribution.
25This scenario excludes inte´ressement payments for “regular jobs”, although it applies
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3. A comparison scenario for evaluating the importance of job loss: job
loss occurs with a fixed probability every month and inte´ressement
payments are computed for those who are eligible until their eligibility
runs out (unless they lose their job first), then the individual is subject
to the regular earnings environment (including the RMI minimum in-
come guarantee) until the job is lost. When a job is lost, the individual
returns to the RMI program forever.26
The first scenario is the baseline because it simply compares the mon-
etary value of a job with the value of welfare. This is comparable to what
is done in the “making work pay” literature. The last scenario can be seen
as a lower bound to the gains because the possibility of job-loss decreases
the value of employment, whereas the value of non-employment does not
take into account the event that new labor earnings can be available in the
future. Under each scenario, we compute the present value of earnings as ex-
plained in section 3.2 (to account for changes of income flows over time due
to the inte´ressement rules) and convert it to a constant monthly flow.27 In
the case of individuals living in couples, we assume that the spouse/partner
provides no additional labor income.28 This is compared to the monthly
flow of disposable income from the RMI (i.e. assuming no one works) in or-
der to calculate the gain to employment. Table 2 describes the distribution
of these gains for different household types and under the different scenar-
ios. Figures 6a-6c trace some of the distributions of gains for the baseline
scenario (singles only).
Our estimates suggest that almost every household gains from work in
the baseline case. This is because the 100% tax rate only applies in a very
particular circumstance: the household has exhausted its entitlement to
inte´ressement, it does not get a CES job and earnings are below those of a
half-time minimum wage job (approximately). This combination happens
the appropriate legislation in attributing top-up payments to any individual employed on
a CES because they are not subject to exhaustion and these payments are simply part of
the CES scheme.
26We use the empirically observed monthly rates of transition out of regular and CES
employment toward non-employment. Based on the activity calendars, these correspond
to 0.0589104 and 0.0560717 respectively.
27We apply a monthly discount factor of 0.995, which is equivalent to an annual interest
rate of roughly 6%
28The question of the joint labor supply decision is beyond the scope of this paper. This
assumption implies that we are calculating a lower bound of the gains to employment for
couples, although much of our subsequent analysis will focus on singles. Gurgand and
Margolis (2000) examine the implications of relaxing this hypothesis, but in the absence
of inte´ressement.
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rarely. On the hand, the value of the estimated monetary gains are small.
For comparability between household types, gains are computed either per
adult equivalent or as a percentage increase over welfare income. The highest
gains are for single persons, and even then the median gain is only 103.70
euros per month. For single parents or couples, median gains are only 30 to
70 euros per person. It should also be noted that the large difference between
mean and median gains suggests a very skewed distribution of gains, with a
large probability mass at low levels (driven by CES jobs) and several higher
gains that serve to pull the mean upwards: this is confirmed by figures 6a-
6c. Figure 6c also shows a small mode for men around full-time work. For
women, the distribution is multimodal because of the impact of the number
of children (compare figures 6a and 6b). In line with figure 5a, full-time
work generates only a very slight mode for women.
The results for women, especially single mothers, are particularly wor-
risome and are due to a combination of factors. These women are found in
the lower tails of the distributions of wage rates and hours and they are sub-
ject to high implicit tax rates through the means-testing of family benefits.
These small monetary gains would likely result in a net loss to single mothers
when child care costs (not measured here) are added in. The French transfer
system includes a special program to subsidize child care, while schooling is
free from age 3. But it is unlikely that this assistance at the margin would
be a sufficient complement to the very small estimated potential gains to
employment.
Comparing the baseline to the simulation without inte´ressement, it ap-
pears that the contribution of the inte´ressement scheme to the distribution
of gains is very limited. Inte´ressement mechanically ensures that 13% addi-
tional beneficiaries will have a strictly positive gain from working (increasing
the percentage with gains from 86% to 99%), but there is practically no vis-
ible difference in the amounts of the gains to employment. One reason is
that the 13% marginal beneficiaries are among the lowest paid, and as such
they contribute small gains.
The other reason for the apparently minor impact of the suppression of
the inte´ressement scheme is that the amount of additional gains provided
by inte´ressement is limited on average. Recall that, in this simulation, the
suppression of inte´ressement payments does not concern CES jobs, as they
are subject to a separate set of rules.29 In addition, the changes relative
to the baseline case do not apply to observations with household income
29This is the reason why the median values, which are primarily driven by the prevalence
of CES jobs, remain unaffected.
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above twice the RMI threshold (because then eligibility to both RMI and
inte´ressement is lost), while the top-up only corresponds to 50% of a small
amount when wages are small enough to benefit from the inte´ressement
scheme. Finally, since the top-up is only available for a limited amount
of time (750 hours of work or less), the present value of the corresponding
“wealth” is only marginally affected by the periods during which the top-up
is available, even if one applies a high discount factor. Overall, the features of
the inte´ressement system, especially its time-limited nature, seem to imply
that it may have a very small potential to affect incentives to work despite
the relatively large kinks in the disposable income profiles (see figure 2).
This is probably one of the reasons why the rules governing the inte´ressement
scheme were modified in 1998 and 2001 so as to extend its applicability from
750 hours to about one year and reduce the implicit marginal tax rate from
50% to 0% during the first three months.
Accounting for the possibility of job-loss in scenario 3 leads to a quan-
titatively different picture than the more static comparison of the previous
scenarios. Allowing for a job termination probability of 5-6% every month
reduces the gains to employment substantially. Although this simulation can
be viewed as a lower bound, the highly unstable nature of the jobs avail-
able to this specific population make this simulation informative. This also
suggests that a dynamic model which would allow transitions to and from
employment should be developed, but formalizing such a structural model
is complicated by the highly non-stationary nature of the rules governing
the inte´ressement scheme. Although stylized, the relatively straightforward
scenarios presented here are useful for gaining intuition about possible labor
supply incentive effects inherent in the system.
6 The Relation Between Gains to Work and Em-
ployment
The discussion thus far has been centered on the gains to employment for the
entire (representative) population of RMI recipients. However, the possible
monetary incentive effects on labor supply of the RMI, insofar as they have
behavioral consequences, should be visible when comparing the simulated
gains of people actually observed in employment with those of people not
observed employed. In particular, equation 1 implies that those observed in
employment may tend to have larger gains to employment than comparable
workers not observed in employment.
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6.1 Gains to Employment and Observed Employment Status
Figures 5a and 5b compare three distributions of hours. Unconditional (on
employment status) distributions are simulated for the employed and the
non-employed populations (dashed lines). This describes the ex ante in-
centives that are faced by each population and depends only on structural
differences in terms of observable characteristics. It is clear that the pop-
ulation that was indeed observed employed has access to longer working
times. Moreover, the simulated likelihood that women are offered only the
minimum wage is 82% in the employed population and 87% among the un-
employed; these figures are 81% and 85% respectively for men.30 Given that
people can only choose to accept or reject the jobs that may be proposed to
them, observed wages and hours among the employed population are again
different from jobs offered to that population. This is, strictly speaking,
the selection effect, drawn in solid line on the figures. For both men and
women, observed hours are more often around full-time, with clearly higher
wages:31 74% of women do work for the minimum wage (to be compared
to the simulated 82% offered in the same population); the figure is 66%
for men (to be compared with the simulated 81%). Both composition and
selection effects combine to generate very different pictures of the employed
and non-employed populations.
Table 3 decomposes the corresponding distributions of gains to employ-
ment under the baseline scenario. Although it is clear that a smaller share
of individuals among the population actually observed in employment has
positive simulated gains,32 it is also evident that the value of these gains
are, on average, larger. This is true for almost all cells in the table. Fur-
thermore, expressed in terms of gains, the selection effect seems very large.
An important point to note is that this occurs because accepted jobs not
only involve a higher wage rate but also a longer working time. With more
than 80% of proposed jobs at the minimum wage, working time becomes
an important adjustment variable. It seems that welfare beneficiaries, when
working, would rather work longer hours in order to increase their gains.
30By construction, the distributions of wages above the minimum wage are identical in
our statistical model.
31The figures draw marginal distributions, but the correlations estimated in table 1
imply that the effect of wages reinforces that of hours, i.e. a lower probability of a
minimum wage job is associated with a higher probability of full-time employment.
32This is because the entitlement to inte´ressement in the non-employed population tends
to be larger, by construction.
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6.2 Structural labor supply estimation
In order to provide a more structured depiction of the above presentation of
gains by employment status, we estimate the structural employment model
defined by equations 6 and 7. Because of data limitations, we were forced
to adopt a very simple specification. For women, the only control variables
in the Z vector are age and the number of children in three age classes.
For men, only age is maintained because the number of children appeared
irrelevant. We adopted 2 very simple functional forms for k(h): log(h) or
a dummy variable for more than 130 monthly hours. The potential gains
(expressed in logarithms) are computed using the baseline scenario. The
model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood, using 500 draws to
estimate the joint distribution of (wd, hd|X) in the evaluation of the double
integral in equation 7 and assuming a standard normal distribution for ε.33
To avoid the complexities related to joint labor market decisions, ta-
ble 4 presents the results of estimating this employment model on single-
adult households only (70% of the sample). Although the model speci-
fication is reduced to its basics, our estimation presents some interesting
results. As expected from the above discussion, the income and hours vari-
ables have a significant influence on employment probability, although their
respective impact is difficult to distinguish. The coefficient on disposable
income (α in equations 6 and 7) is high and precisely estimated in the
absence of the hours variable. It implies that a 10% increase in the ratio
D (wh, y0, Z) /D (0, y0, Z) would result in a 11% average increase in employ-
ment probability for both men and women in the population. When working
time is included, however, the estimated α shrinks dramatically and is not
always significant. Indeed, hours alone explain 89% of the variance in gains
for men and 78% for women, so that collinearity is an issue. When test-
ing the joint significance of disposable income and hours, despite the fact
that the effects of the two variables are hard to distinguish precisely, their
joint significance is very large (recall that the 99% confidence level for χ2 is
9.21).34
Whether measured as a continuous variable or with a dummy, both
men and women are more likely to accept jobs that offer more hours of
work. These results are compatible with estimates obtained by Laroque and
33Note that the standard errors reported in this table are not corrected for the presence
of estimated regressors, notably the gains to employment and the hours offer for people
not observed in employment.
34When the age variable is not present, there is less collinearity and the results are
more precise, but for a priori labor supply considerations we hesitate to adopt such a
specification.
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Salanie´ (2002) for the whole French female population. In their context,
there is much more variation in the wage rate, so that collinearity is less of
an issue.
Finally, older beneficiaries are less likely to be observed working in 1998.
This result is robust and very precisely estimated. Women with young
children also work less and this effect is also strong: one more child aged
below 3 would decrease the probability of a single woman being employed
by 90% on average. As noted above, this is consistent with the idea that
the very low gains that single women can expect from employment, coupled
with the likely high costs of caring for small children, can render negative
the net return to working for a single mother with small children.
6.3 Discussion
Overall, these structural estimates suggest that monetary incentives have
non-negligible effects on labor supply in this population. Although potential
gains from working are small on average for the whole population, welfare
beneficiaries are observed working when earnings are higher than the typical
earnings accessible. Those two considerations imply that there is scope for
improving incentives.
It must be noted that this is a strict labor supply interpretation of the
basic facts presented in the previous sections. In the theoretical model, we
do not allow the possibility that job offers may not be proposed at all to
some of the welfare beneficiaries. It could be argued that individual with
more productive characteristics are also more likely to receive offers. In our
specification, the negative values of the intercept (table 4) are taken to mean
that no work is preferred to some work. If a probability that a job is offered
at all was added to the model, it would be identified separately from this
intercept under strong conditions35 that would not be empirically relevant in
our data. Our implicit assumption is rather that a job can always be found
(and represented by a draw from the distribution (wd, hd|X)), but that the
offer may be so unattractive that most individuals would be reluctant to
take it. Such an assumption is compatible with sociological field analysis of
this population (Benarrosh, 2003).
In this context, the central hypothesis for the structural model is in-
dependence between preferences and proposed earnings. Given the limited
impact of observed characteristics that are usually strong determinants of
wages in the earnings equations (table 1), we believe it is unlikely that some
35Laroque and Salanie´ (2002) use an “ad infinitum” type of reasoning to justify their
identification of the probability of receiving a job offer.
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unobserved individual-specific characteristic related to the relative taste for
work could have a strong and systematic effect on offered wages. We are
thus confident that at least some of the difference between potential and
observed wages can be attributed to labor supply effects.
A direct consequence of this independence hypothesis is that selectivity
in the wage equations is not interpreted as arising from individual unob-
served characteristics, but rather from sorting into the most satisfactory job
offer. This is the reason why jobs are drawn unconditionally (on employment
status) in the simulations. Were we to interpret selection effects as being
due to unobserved individual characteristics, the non-employed population
would have even lower simulated earnings. Because the non-employed are
a majority, this would put even more weight on lower potential gains from
working in the overall distribution.
Finally, note that our likelihood function implicitly assumes that welfare
beneficiaries only make one draw from the job offer distribution which they
may take or leave. This is very much in line with the static approach to
labor supply. In contrast, Dickens and Lundberg (1993) allow workers to
choose among a random number of offers. In such a context, those who had
the opportunity to choose between a larger number of alternatives would
select jobs with higher earnings and would therefore be more often observed
in employment. However, for the purpose of estimating the sensitivity of
preferences to disposable income, assuming (1) that some people have a
chance to draw a high wage or assuming (2) that some people have a chance
to make a large number of draws, among which there is more often a high
wage, are functionally equivalent.
7 Conclusion
The evaluation of potential labor earnings for recipients of a guaranteed min-
imum income transfer (such as the French RMI system) is a conceptually and
technically delicate exercise. It remains, nevertheless, an indispensable piece
of information in the debate concerning the incentive effects on labor sup-
ply of welfare. Simulations for “representative households” and calculations
based exclusively on estimated effective marginal tax rates are inadequate,
in that they do not account for the heterogeneity in labor market conditions
that RMI recipients face. In this paper, we have considered the interaction
between the labor market and the system of taxes and transfers in effect
in France in 1998 (with the exception of local taxes and local transfers) ac-
counting for the presence of the supplemental earnings top-up provided by
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the welfare system under the name of inte´ressement. Since RMI recipients
tend to be very different from the population as a whole in terms of their
reemployment labor earnings, it is important to use an RMI-centered survey
to obtain reasonable sample sizes of the population of interest. But since the
sorts of jobs to which RMI recipients can aspire tend to be rather particu-
lar, most notably due to the predominance of active labor market programs
(such as France’s CES jobs), it becomes essential to specify a model to pre-
dict wage and hours offers that fits the observed data on welfare recipients
as well as possible.
We find that almost all welfare beneficiaries would gain from being em-
ployed on a job randomly drawn from the distribution of job offers, relative
to staying on welfare. But the size of the gains is extremely small and is
sensitive to the manner by which the gains are constructed, in particular
how one treats the risk of job-loss. As of 1998, the inte´ressement scheme
provided only marginal additional incentives. Most strikingly, the monetary
work incentives for single mothers are very limited. Were we able to directly
integrate child care costs and locally available means-tested assistance poli-
cies, we would almost surely find a net loss associated with work for French
single mothers.
We find that the distribution of gains that we estimate for the population
of individuals actually observed in employment differs from that of those
individuals observed out of employment at the time of the follow-up survey.
We interpret this as a labor supply effect and quantify it based on a simple
structural employment model, although some of our point estimates are
imprecise, in part due to the high degree of collinearity between disposable
income and hours worked. The structural model is based on assumptions
that make its estimation feasible with the limited data at hand. As such, our
results should not be over interpreted. Nevertheless, the general impression
given by the presence of both limited potential monetary gains and relatively
high sensitivity of employment to gains indicates that there is likely to be
some scope for improving incentives for labor supply in the French system.
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Figure 3a: Model Fit - Hours
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Figure 3b: Model Fit - Log Hourly Wages
Above the Minimum Wage
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Figure 4a: Observed Monthly Earnings - Women
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Figure 4b: Observed Monthly Earnings - Men
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Figure 5a: Selectivity - Hours, Female
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Figure 5b: Selectivity - Hours, Male
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Selection Working time
Intercept -0.7140 *** -1.1522 *** 1.0296 ** 0.4126
(0.1358) (0.1256) (0.4426) (0.6342)
Age -0.8298 ** -0.2377 0.1595 -1.2293
(0.4046) (0.4330) (0.8186) (0.9280)
Age2 0.5179 0.0733 -0.1164 1.2283
(0.4093) (0.4369) (0.8226) (0.9378)
French Nationality -0.0811 -0.1623 -0.3367 -0.1594
(0.1148) (0.1258) (0.2609) (0.3015)
Paris Region -0.1829 -0.5570 *** -0.2518 0.2077
(0.1161) (0.1747) (0.2773) (0.2714)
Education Category 1 (higher) 0.6280 *** -0.1067 -0.6378 * -0.3982
(0.1424) (0.1811) (0.3285) (0.3975)
Education Category 2 (upper sec.) 0.3893 *** -0.0841 0.0823 0.0143
(0.1470) (0.1825) (0.3527) (0.3892)
Education Category 3 (lower sec.) -0.0645 0.0100 -0.0019 -0.2104
(0.1390) (0.1470) (0.3245) (0.3642)
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0.2713 ** 0.1350 -0.2508 0.2018
(0.1229) (0.1362) (0.2915) (0.3432)
Log(D 0 (0, y 0 , Z)) 0.0263
(0.0750)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0.0436
(0.0427)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old -0.0479
(0.0530)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0.0782 *
(0.0421)
Couple 0.3266 **
(0.1474)
Widow 0.2708
(0.4140)
Divorced 0.1614
(0.1432)
m 3.3704 ***
(0.1895)
s 0.1711 ***
(0.0275)
s1 2.8649 ***
(0.2344)
s2 60.4063 ***
(8.2833)
ρ Employment, CES 0.9981 ***
(0.1608)
ρ Minimum Wage, Working Time -0.2146
(0.1865)
ρ Employment, Minimum Wage -0.4105
(0.4020)
ρ Employment, Working Time -0.1806
(0.5134)
# observations 1303
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors of estimates of constrained parameters (s, s 1 , s 2 and the various ρ ) obtained using the delta method. *** indicates a
coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** indicates a coefficient signficant at the 5% level and * indicates a coefficient significant
at the 10% level.
Table 1 : Results of Selection-Corrected CES and Wage - Working Time Models
Men
CES Wage
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Selection Working time
Intercept -0.7189 *** -0.6495 1.0297 ** -1.2948 **
(0.1650) (0.4596) (0.4738) (0.5563)
Age -0.0865 0.9233 *** -1.6578 * -1.0051
(0.3555) (0.1793) (0.9105) (1.1546)
Age2 -0.0259 -1.1507 *** 1.7457 * 0.6519
(0.3566) (0.1679) (0.9071) (1.2394)
French Nationality -0.0708 -0.0381 -0.0250 -0.1902
(0.1404) (0.2440) (0.3234) (0.4287)
Paris Region -0.0073 -1.0405 *** -0.1011 0.4475 *
(0.1252) (0.2799) (0.2119) (0.2411)
Education Category 1 (higher) 0.8201 *** -0.3595 -0.9690 *** 0.6905
(0.1513) (0.3259) (0.3141) (0.4731)
Education Category 2 (upper sec.) 0.7031 *** -0.0706 -0.2176 -0.1503
(0.1421) (0.2945) (0.3363) (0.5309)
Education Category 3 (lower sec.) 0.2055 0.0654 -0.1392 -0.4740
(0.1252) (0.2337) (0.2872) (0.5223)
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0.4135 *** 0.1091 0.1031 -0.1118
(0.1204) (0.2414) (0.3122) (0.5063)
Log(D 0 (0, y 0 , Z)) 0.1838 ***
(0.0648)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0.3549 ***
(0.0576)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old -0.1364 **
(0.0602)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old -0.0501
(0.0446)
Couple -0.4618 ***
(0.1133)
Widow -0.5580 **
(0.2338)
Divorced -0.0740
(0.0986)
m 3.4005 ***
(0.1935)
s 0.1981 ***
(0.0349)
s1 2.5135 ***
(0.3361)
s2 38.6605 ***
(3.1113)
ρ Employment, CES 0.4028
(0.2714)
ρ Minimum Wage, Working Time -0.3294 *
(0.1767)
ρ Employment, Minimum Wage -0.5487 *
(0.2921)
ρ Employment, Working Time 0.5592 *
(0.3021)
# observations 1461
Table 1 (Continued): Results of Selection-Corrected CES and Wage - Working Time Models
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors of estimates of constrained parameters (s, s 1 , s 2 and the various ρ ) obtained using the delta method. *** indicates a
coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** indicates a coefficient signficant at the 5% level and * indicates a coefficient significant
at the 10% level.
CES Wage
Women
 35
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0.99 174.62 103.70 0.86 173.48 103.70 0.98 14.53 8.53
Single female, no children 0.97 224.20 103.70 0.85 222.33 103.70 0.97 18.84 8.53
Single female, 1 child 0.99 99.29 69.13 0.72 97.13 69.13 0.95 9.26 5.69
Single female, 2 children 0.97 84.32 51.85 0.78 82.97 51.85 0.97 7.52 4.26
Single female, > 2 children 1.00 93.90 71.19 0.88 93.28 71.19 0.99 7.83 5.91
Single male, no children 0.99 281.30 103.70 0.95 280.74 103.70 0.99 22.62 8.53
Single male, with children 1.00 139.38 69.13 0.94 138.80 69.13 0.99 11.47 5.69
Couple, no children 0.99 104.88 61.00 0.86 103.91 61.00 0.97 8.99 5.02
Couple, 1 child 0.99 83.29 47.14 0.80 82.06 47.14 0.97 7.42 3.88
Couple, 2 children 0.98 63.05 38.41 0.80 61.99 38.41 0.98 5.70 3.16
Couple, > 2 children 0.99 65.22 32.46 0.86 64.61 32.45 0.99 5.53 3.01
36
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0.99 0.46 0.21 0.86 0.46 0.21 0.98 0.04 0.02
Single female, no children 0.97 0.57 0.32 0.85 0.56 0.32 0.97 0.05 0.03
Single female, 1 child 0.99 0.23 0.14 0.72 0.23 0.14 0.95 0.02 0.01
Single female, 2 children 0.97 0.21 0.12 0.78 0.21 0.12 0.97 0.02 0.01
Single female, > 2 children 1.00 0.25 0.19 0.88 0.25 0.19 0.99 0.02 0.02
Single male, no children 0.99 0.75 0.32 0.95 0.74 0.32 0.99 0.06 0.03
Single male, with children 1.00 0.31 0.14 0.94 0.31 0.14 0.99 0.03 0.01
Couple, no children 0.99 0.28 0.15 0.86 0.28 0.15 0.97 0.02 0.01
Couple, 1 child 0.99 0.25 0.13 0.80 0.24 0.13 0.97 0.02 0.01
Couple, 2 children 0.98 0.19 0.11 0.80 0.19 0.11 0.98 0.02 0.01
Couple, > 2 children 0.99 0.20 0.11 0.86 0.20 0.11 0.99 0.02 0.01
Table 2: Gains to Work by Household Type
Baseline simulation Without Intéressement , no job loss With Intéressement  and job loss
Monthly gains per adult equivalent
Baseline simulation Without Intéressement , no job loss With Intéressement  and job loss
Monthly gains increase as a percentage of non-employment income
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Gains are based on estimated wages and hours potentially offered by employers. They
are measured in Euros, and are computed as monthly flow from intertemporal wealth. The equivalence scale uses weights: 1 for first adult, 0.7 for second adult and 0.5 for
children.
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0.97 255.68 159.55 0.96 198.31 103.70 0.99 166.16 103.70
Single female, no children 0.98 385.53 348.51 0.93 259.77 103.70 0.99 209.40 103.70
Single female, 1 child 0.90 252.03 290.88 0.99 98.13 69.13 1.00 99.79 69.13
Single female, 2 children 0.97 181.50 200.64 0.90 86.84 51.85 1.00 83.43 51.8537 Single female, > 2 children 1.00 177.45 174.53 1.00 104.01 80.39 1.00 92.32 69.91
Single male, no children 0.97 268.94 129.14 0.97 304.46 103.70 1.00 272.47 103.70
Single male, with children 1.00 228.91 126.19 0.98 128.78 69.13 1.00 142.41 69.13
Couple, no children 1.00 191.39 168.66 0.98 112.62 61.00 1.00 102.27 61.00
Couple, 1 child 0.96 202.85 146.47 0.97 89.98 47.14 1.00 80.40 47.14
Couple, 2 children 1.00 97.66 98.18 0.94 66.44 38.41 0.99 62.11 38.41
Couple, > 2 children 0.97 108.35 98.71 0.98 73.97 39.69 0.99 63.43 32.41
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Observed gains are computed from reported wages. Simulated gains are based on
estimated wages and hours potentially offered by employers. They are measured in Euros, and are computed as monthly flow from intertemporal wealth. The equivalence scale
uses weights: 1 for first adult, 0.7 for second adult and 0.5 for children.
Simulated gains Simulated gains 
Table 3: Gains to Work by Employment status
Monthly gains per adult equivalent (baseline simulation)
Observed Gains
on employed population on non-employed population
Intercept -1.1812 -1.9513 -1.1315 -1.156
(0.0952) (0.6981) (0.0952) (0.0919)
Log disposable income 0.9584 0.7945 0.3357 0.6404
(0.1616) (0.2155) (0.2409) (0.2395)
Log hours worked 0.1817
(0.1628)
Full time dummy (>130 monthly hours) 0.6404 0.5425
(0.1941) (0.1897)
Age -0.3875 -0.3948 -0.409
(0.0579) (0.0585) (0.0598)
Joint significance of disposable income 
and hours variable (Wald test) 36.98 46.33 63.99
Number of Observations 820 820 820 820
Log Likelihood -424.6 -423.95066 -419.0282 -444.40802
Intercept -0.9533 -2.4035 -0.9252 -2.1966
(0.0785) (0.5061) (0.0782) (0.5008)
Log disposable income 0.8883 0.4381 0.3787 0.7319
(0.2180) (0.2536) (0.2906) (0.2542)
Log hours worked 0.3490 0.2889
(0.1197) (0.1184)
Full time dummy (>130 monthly hours) 0.4705
(0.1986)
Age -0.2818 -0.2971 -0.2713
(0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0521)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0.4393 -0.4524 -0.4519 -0.4144
(0.1087) (0.1102) (0.1104) (0.1104)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old 0.0232 0.0000 -0.0070 0.0537
(0.0602) (0.0589) (0.0478) (0.0593)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0.0311 0.0173 0.0219 -0.0692
(0.0489) (0.0492) (0.0489) (0.0477)
Joint significance of disposable income 
and hours variable (Wald test) 26.65 22.24 33.52
Number of Observations 952 952 952 952
Log Likelihood -514.45 -509.87787 -511.54768 -526.44362
Table 4: Results of the Structural Employment Model
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey limited to single
persons. Simulated maximum likelihood. See text for specification and normalizations.
Men
Women
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Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Age 37.5687 8.3669 36.6742 8.4803
French Nationality 0.8573 0.3499 0.9199 0.2715
Paris Region 9.5549 25.0160 7.1355 22.0132
Education Category 1 (higher) 0.1527 0.3599 0.1123 0.3158
Education Category 2 (upper secondary) 0.1220 0.3274 0.1211 0.3264
Education Category 3 (lower secondary) 0.1865 0.3897 0.2416 0.4282
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0.3400 0.4739 0.3183 0.4660
Education Category 5 (primary) 0.1988 0.3992 0.2067 0.4051
Couple 0.2939 0.4557 0.2327 0.4227
Widower / Widow 0.0084 0.0915 0.0438 0.2047
Divorced 0.1044 0.3059 0.2539 0.4354
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old 0.0837 0.2957 0.1040 0.3229
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old 0.3354 0.8214 0.8172 1.0463
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0.1051 0.3945 0.2005 0.4940
Employed 0.3331 0.4715 0.3073 0.4615
CES contract if employed 0.2880 0.4534 0.3675 0.4827
Hourly wage if employed 5.6793 2.9676 5.3923 1.4491
Monthly hours if employed 129.8867 46.4072 104.3277 44.9366
Entitlement to Intéressement available 0.8918 0.3108 0.8652 0.3417
Full entitlement to Intéressement if available 0.6867 0.4640 0.7658 0.4237
Exhausted entitilement to Intéressement if available 0.2126 0.4093 0.1416 0.3488
Partial entitlement to Intéressement if available 0.1007 0.3010 0.0926 0.2899
# observations 1303 1461
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey.
Men Women
Appendix : Descriptive Statistics
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